An Meaning Problem in the Thought of the 20th and 21st Centuries
Wittgenstein, one of the philosophers who deal with the relationship between language and meaning, examines the structure and functioning of language as well as the world associated with language.
According to Wittgenstein, the world is the sum of facts. Just as the world is the sum of facts, meaningful language is the sum of propositions. Propositions are truth functions of simple propositions; terms are the basic building blocks of language.
In correspondence to this structure, the world consists of the sum of facts. Facts are the existence of state of affairs. State of affairs also consist of objects. When language is analyzed, each step corresponds to each step that constitutes the world. 112 Terms, which are the basic components of language, correspond to objects, which are the basic components of the world; state of affairs, which are formed by the relationships of objects, correspond to simple propositions formed by the arrangement of names; facts correspond to propositions, and ultimately, the world corresponds to meaningful language. 113
The relationship between language and the world The possibility of a mutual relationship is reflected in the structure of language, which in turn reflects the structure of the world. Logic is crucial in both.
Every entity has a specific structure. The analysis of an entity is the same as the analysis of the proposition corresponding to it. The analysis of the proposition provides the positional forms of the constitutive elements, which are the terms. In parallel, the structure of the analyzed proposition will give us the positional relationships of the objects, which are the constitutive elements of the represented entity. Thus, the elements of the state of affairs expressed in the proposition correspond to the constitutive elements of the proposition sign. Wittgenstein refers to the simple elements that make up the proposition sign as “directions” or “objects”. A name indicates an object. In the proposition, the name represents the object.
Terms in language point to objects. In a sentence, they will correspond to the objects that constitute the state of affairs and represent them in a certain way. They are positioned in e manner. Terms like objects are also simple and unresolvable; therefore, terms are fundamental signs.
“A term cannot be dissected with any definition: it is a primitive sign.”
One of the fundamental elements that allows a fact situation to be formally proposed is that terms represent the objects that make up the fact situation. The connection between a name and the thing it names is optional. The elements that make up the proposition are associated with the elements of reality by humans; any sign can be chosen to represent an object.
Since the selection of signs is optional, in cases where the order of signs does not convey any meaning, the reason is not a mistake in the selection of signs; it is the failure to establish a proper relationship between it and reality. In other words, the sign has not been properly transformed into a symbol. According to Wittgenstein, every possible proposition is constructed according to a rule:
“Frege says: Every proposition is constructed according to its rule.” There must be a meaning to every proposition; I also say that: Every possible proposition is constructed according to its rules; if it does not have a meaning, it is because we have not directed some of its constituting elements. (Even if we think we have done so.)
Thus, as we mentioned before, the reason for the meaninglessness of the proposition “Socrates is identical” is the lack of the property of “being identical”.
“This proposition is meaningless because we have not made a contingent determination: not because the symbol is invalid in itself and on its own.”
Therefore, the lack of meaning of a proposition is not due to it not being constructed according to its rules, but rather due to some of its constituting elements not being directed.
The terms combine in a chain-like manner to form a simple proposition. All propositions can be analyzed into their constituent simple propositions. However, simple propositions themselves cannot be divided into simpler constituting propositions. İşletmez, olmadığı gerçek ise onu çürütmek zorundadır.” 131
Wittgenstein undoubtedly acknowledges that at first glance the proposition does not appear like a picture.
“At first glance, the proposition – for example, in printed form on paper – does not seem like a picture of the reality it refers to. But musical notation also doesn’t seem like the design of music at first glance, our written language (alphabet) also doesn’t seem like the design of our spoken language. The elements of the proposition do not resemble the elements of the situation they represent, and there is no direct connection between words and the elements of reality.” 135
However, the sharedness of the logical form we mentioned earlier makes it the image of a factual situation.
“The record, musical thought, musical notation, sound waves, all of them exist within the internal relationship that is the design between language and the world. They all share a logical structure.” 136
Every picture represents a specific factual situation. According to what you have said, when it comes to a painting, there are two factors to consider. The first one is what the painting represents. This question is related to the meaning of that statement. On the other hand, the other factor is whether the painting accurately or falsely represents what it is supposed to represent, in other words, whether it is appropriate to the facts. This is also related to the truth value of the statement.
When a proposition is expressed verbally or in writing, it is called a proposition sign. Proposition signs serve the purpose of expressing thoughts. These are tools that reflect a possible state of affairs. Reflection is the logical representation of the possible state of affairs that gives meaning to the proposition, i.e., thinking. Thought is what converts the sign, the symbol, into a proposition.
The combination of terms is not essential in terms of their being symbols. Because “P” itself can very well be a name just like “Platon”. On the other hand, a proposition is a complex structure. Unlike names, the parts of a proposition are it olurum.
Bu aynı zamanda yalnızca terimlerden oluşan bir bütün olduğunda, anlam ifade edemez. Bir müzik temasının rastgele dizilmiş notalardan ortaya çıkmadığı gibi, kelimelerin de bu şekilde dizilmesi bir önerme oluşturmaz. 143 Önerme sadece bir kelime yığını değildir. O, birlikte çalışan bir yapıdır. 144 Wittgenstein’a göre, bir önermeyi oluşturan şey, öğelerinin belirli bir biçimde bir araya getirilmesidir.
Bir önerme yalnızca terimlerin bir kümesi değildir. Terimleri nesnelerle ilişkilendirebilmek için, önermedeki terimlerin birbirleriyle olan ilişkisi ile gerçek dünyadaki nesnelerin birbirleriyle olan ilişkisi arasında bir karşılıklılık olmalıdır.
“Bir kelime bir şeyin yerine kullanılır, bir başkası da başka bir şeyin yerine, ve aralarında bir bağlantı vardır, böylece -canlı bir tablo gibi- şey du They put the Romani in a bowl and present it.” 146
Logical connection is undoubtedly possible between things in which the terms themselves are representative, and this is always the case if the terms are truly representatives of things. 147
Propositions are formed with simple propositions and truth-functional relationships. A simple proposition is its own truth function, while a proposition is the truth function of the simple propositions it contains. 148 Because the truth value of propositions is related to the truth value of the simple propositions that make it up. A proposition is true or false depending on whether it corresponds to reality. Therefore, it is not possible to say whether it is true or false by staying within it. 149 Proposition can only take on truth value by being compared to reality. 150
Proposition is determined by its truth value. According to Wittgenstein’s determination, every proposition has two poles, true or false. Whether the fact it represents actually exists or not determines its truth or falsehood. It would be wrong. These two poles establish the relationship between the proposition and reality. There is nothing blurry in this relationship. The truthfulness of the proposition is determined by either yes or no, by the presence or absence of facts. Each proposition describes a possible state of affairs. However, this does not mean that every proposition depicts an actual state of affairs. When a specific state of affairs is given, we know whether it depicts its actual state or its negation. The meaning of a proposition is for it to be true or false. The meaning of a proposition is what constitutes a fact when it is true or false.
When stating that reality needs to be compared for the verification of a proposition, 153 refers to Wittgenstein’s consideration of the picture theory of language. If the proposition was not a picture, we would not know where to look in the world to verify it. What makes a proposition true or false is that it is a representation of reality according to 156.
From Wittgenstein’s perspective, a noun Understanding is the understanding of his direction. In order to understand the direction of a word, it is necessary for the signs to be previously explained and for which word refers to which object to be determined. This is not the case for understanding the meaning of a proposition. When we understand the proposition, what we understand is not its direction but its meaning.
While each new word requires a special explanation, the spontaneous understanding of a previously unheard proposition is related to a fundamental difference between terms and propositions. According to Wittgenstein, terms resemble dots, while propositions resemble arrows. Terms are fixed on objects, like dots. However, propositions have meaning: as an arrow, a proposition points to a state of affairs. The state of affairs that propositions point to cannot be named, only described by the proposition.
“States of affairs can be described, but not named. (Terms resemble dots, propositions resemble arrows, they have meaning.)” 158 The proposition is inherently understandable. 159 The terms direct towards objects in relation. However, their relation with the object is not necessary, it is determined by a contingent connection. The same applies to the relation between terms, in order to represent the relation between objects. But once these rules are established, there is no need for another rule to say that these terms in that relation mean those objects in that relation. This explains how a previously unheard proposition can be understood inherently, while a special explanation is required for each new term.
A term either names something or is not a meaningful symbol. Propositions have a different aspect from terms. Understanding propositions is related to understanding their constituent elements, the words. 160 To be true or false constitutes the relation of the proposition with reality. Its meaningfulness is its ability to be true or false. 161 In this case, the understanding of the proposition. There is no need to know whether it is right or not. Unlike terms, propositions remain meaningful even when they are not true.
According to Wittgenstein, meaningful expressions are genuine propositions. Genuine propositions, which are the formal representation of facts, state whether the fact is true or false. Therefore, all genuine propositions are empirical and contingent.
For a proposition to be a priori true means that its truth value is derived solely from itself, without being compared to reality. However, for a proposition to be meaningful and therefore true, it must also have the potential to be false. In other words, all meaningful propositions must derive their truth values through reality, that is, they must be contingent. In this case, no proposition is a priori true.
See Grayling, Wittgenstein, p. 29.
See ibid.
See ibid., p. 31.
See Wittgenstein, TLP 3.2.
See Wittgenstein, TLP 3.201.
117 Refer to Wittgenstein, TLP 3.202.
118 Refer to Wittgenstein, TLP 3.203.
119 Refer to Wittgenstein, TLP 3.203.
120 Refer to Wittgenstein, TLP 3.22.
121 Wittgenstein, TLP 3.26.
122 Refer to Wittgenstein, TLP 4.0312.
123 Refer to Wittgenstein, TLP 3.322.
124 Wittgenstein, TLP 5.4733.
125 Wittgenstein, TLP 5.473.
126 Refer to Wittgenstein, TLP 4.22.
127 Refer to Glock, A Wittgenstein Dictionary, p. 102.
128 Wittgenstein, TLP 4.21.
129 Refer to Wittgenstein, TLP 4.25.
130 Refer to Glock, A Wittgenstein Dictionary, p. 103.
131 Wittgenstein, TLP 5.134.
132 Wittgenstein, TLP 4.211.
133 Refer to Wittgenstein, TLP 4.
134 Refer to Wittgenstein, TLP 3.1.
135 Wittgenstein, TLP 4.011.
136 Wittgenstein, TLP 4.01.
137 Refer to Kenny, Wittgenstein, p. 44.
138 Refer to same.
139 Refer to Wittgenstein, TLP 3.12.
140 Refer to Kenny, Wittgenstein, p. 48.
141 Refer to same.
142 Refer to Wittgenstein, TLP 3.3411.
143 Wittgenstein, TLP 3.141.
144 Refer to Wittgenstein, TLP 3.141.
145 Wittgenstein, TLP 3.14.
146 Wittgenstein, TLP 4.0311.
147 See Kenny, Wittgenstein, p. 52.
148 See Wittgenstein, TLP 5.
149 See Wittgenstein, TLP 6.113.
150 See Wittgenstein, TLP 4.05.
151 See Wittgenstein, Notebooks 1914 – 1916, p. 112.
152 See same, p. 94.
153 Wittgenstein, TLP 4.05.
154 Wittgenstein, TLP 2.223.
155 See Kenny, Wittgenstein, p. 54.
156 See Wittgenstein, TLP 4.06.
157 See Wittgenstein, Notebooks 1914 – 1916, p. 94.
158 Wittgenstein, TLP 3.144.
159 See Wittgenstein, TLP 4.026.
160 See Wittgenstein, TLP 4.024.
161 See Wittgenstein, Notebooks 1914 – 1916, p. 112.
162 See Kenny, Wittgenstein, p. 49.
163 See Wittgenstein, TLP 3.05.
164 See Wittgenstein, Notebooks 1914 – 1916